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1. Introduction 
Bonded labor remains a widespread problem, and the UN has estimated that some 20 million people 
are held in such working conditions around the world (UNHCHR 1999). Many reports on the 
livelihood of these people indicate that they are deprived of their basic liberties, and many live their 
lives in destitution. This has spurred several governments of countries where bonded labor is a 
major problem to ban this institution, and has also led to some regional agreements prohibiting 
forced labor.1 India implemented a bonded labor Act in 1976 and Pakistan in 1992, while 
Bangladesh has made the institution illegal in its constitution. In Nepal, bonded labor has been 
prohibited under the constitution since 1990. In order to initiate enforcement, a government 
declaration against the Kamaiya system of bonded labor contracts was issued in July 2000, and a 
widespread liberation program was undertaken (Hatlebakk 2006 and references therein). Moreover, 
the Nepali Government passed an Act of parliament in 2002 banning the Kamayia bonded labor 
system (Anti-Slavery International 2003). 
 With this background, it is puzzling that much of the economic literature analyzing bonded 
labor and servitude claims that this is a voluntary relationship, at least ex ante (see, for example, 
Genicot 2002). According to this view, bonded laborers choose to become bonded since the 
alternative options are worse than putting themselves into the hands of the landlord. If this were in 
fact the case, then we would expect that banning bonded labor as an institution and emancipating 
these workers would, ceteris paribus, usually have a negative welfare effect on them. Moreover, if 
working in subordination to the landlord were their best option, they would return into the same 
subordinate relationship after emancipation. Anecdotal evidence indicates that some freed laborers 
do so (see, for example, Kloosterboer 1960, Prasad and Chandra 1994, and www.anti-slavery.org 
2005). However, when so many ex-bonded laborers do not return to the landlord, there is no reason 
to generalize and describe the bonded labor institution as a voluntary arrangement. Hence, there 
seems to be a dichotomy in the characterization of bonded labor, which is described as both a 
voluntary and a non-voluntary relationship. 
 Despite the increasing focus on curbing bonded labor through legal action, and despite the 
apparent importance of the impact of this institution on the well-being of the laborers, thorough 
empirical investigations into whether or not bonded labor is voluntary remain scarce. The relevance 
of the question of what is voluntary is evident: if the bonded laborers are kept in their relationship 
with the landlord against their will, then a ban could be an important tool in improving their lives. 
On the other hand, if the bonded laborers have agreed on a long-term labor contract on a voluntary 
basis, then a ban could actually decrease their well-being. In this paper we provide some of the first 
thorough evidence on the voluntary aspect of one bonded labor institution that was banned in Nepal 
– the Kamaiya system in use in the far-western region in Terai. In April-May 2006 we carried out 
in-depth interviews with 54 households where at least one member was a Kamaiya before the 
liberation that started in 2000. 
 This paper also addresses the dichotomy and provides a definition that distinguishes 
voluntary from non-voluntary labor contracts, where only the latter relationship is defined as 
bonded labor. We demonstrate the importance for policy of making this distinction in practice. Even 
though we find in the literature rather different mechanisms that give rise to bonded labor, the 
definition we suggest captures the essential feature of the non-voluntary relationship: these laborers 
are worse off compared to their feasible alternatives. Moreover, we propose a simple test that can be 
used for empirical assessments prior to interventions to help bonded laborers. This test reveals the 
extent of coercion implicit in these labor relationships, which may be crucial for policy intervention. 
                                                     
1 Two regional agreements are Article 6 (2) of the American Convention on Human Rights (1969) and Article 4(2) of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (1950), which affirms “No one shall be required to perform 
forced or compulsory labour” (Anti-Slavery International; ICFTU 2001: 5). 
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Finally, our paper specifies a simple new model that captures the mechanisms that have made it 
possible for the landlord to disguise forced bonded labor as a voluntary relationship, and discusses 
its implications for efforts to emancipate these workers. 
 A natural starting point for assessing the voluntary nature of a bonded labor relationship is to 
scrutinize the availability of better alternative options. If there are alternative working relationships 
that the bonded laborer would prefer to enter into, then the next step is to find the mechanisms that 
prevent the laborer from pursuing these opportunities. Such a procedure may give important 
insights into the nature of bonded labor. We build a simple model that highlights the difference 
between voluntary bonded labor contracts and workers in an unfree relationship with the landlord. 
In that framework, we assume that there are different types of landlords, bondage landlords and 
normal landlords, and that this is not revealed to the laborer before the contract is agreed upon. The 
feature that distinguishes the bondage landlord from the normal landlord is that the former is 
assumed to have an interest in bonding the laborer while the normal type has no such interest. In our 
set-up there will be situations where the bondage landlord offers a credit contract where the laborer 
pledges his future services as a servile laborer as collateral for the loan. We show that strategic 
moves by the landlord to make the laborer default on the loan can result in the laborer being 
permanently trapped in servility. The lack of contract enforcement mechanisms and alternative 
credit providers in the rural economy thus plays a crucial role in explaining bonded labor. In 
contrast to the existing models of bonded labor, our model explains how the laborer enters 
involuntarily into bonded labor, and is kept in this relationship. Imposing a ban, providing proper 
conflict resolution institutions for resolving labor-contract disputes and offering alternative credit 
would then be major tools for emancipating bonded laborers, making them better off.   
 One important contribution to our understanding of the bonded labor relationship comes from 
those who argue that dependency similar to the bonded labor institution may rise from institutions 
where the outcome for one laborer depends on the actions and beliefs of the others. One example is 
found in the widely cited paper of Akerlof (1976), in which he models the caste system as an 
institution where one agent will be punished by all the other agents for deviating from the caste 
rules. As a result, if agents believe that they will be punished for any deviation by others, then the 
caste system becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Consequently, it is not in the interests of one 
individual to break out of the system, but if the system itself were banned, all those who are 
discriminated against under it would be better off. Similarly, if the laborers’ loss of bonding 
themselves decreases in the number of other laborers that bonds themselves, then Schaffner (1995) 
shows that the laborers can be better off if bonded labor is banned when the workers are not 
conscious of such group reference effect.  
 Another example of how the choices of other individuals restrict laborers’ options is 
illustrated by the model in Genicot (2002). She shows that if landlords offer credit to laborers that 
will renege on their loan to a formal credit institution if they become bonded labor, these laborers 
are likely to be denied formal credit in the first place since the formal credit institutions would see 
that they would never repay the formal loans. As a result, the formal credit institutions may be 
eroded, permitting the landlord to charge a higher interest rate on lending to bonded laborers 
compared to the market rate. In this case, banning such bonded labor contracts would contribute 
towards the creation of formal credit institutions, which, once in place, would make the bonded 
laborers better off due to cheaper credit. For other models that show how the laborers’ alternative 
options can be made less attractive by the strategic behavior of the landlord, i.e. where the laborers’ 
reservation positions can be influenced by the landlord, see Hatlebakk (2006), Chambers and 
Quiggin (2000) and Basu (1986). 
 However, when we observe bonded labor in markets with alternative credit opportunities for 
the laborers, so that Genicot’s (2002) model does not apply, and when there is no evidence of 
threats of reciprocal punishment as in Akerlof (1976) or substantial reference group behavior as in 
Schaffner (1995), then we are still left with the question of what are the mechanisms that keep these 
bonded laborers in servility. There are frequent observations of workers asserting that they are 
trapped in their relationship with the landlord against their own will, and the existing literature is 
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not able to explain the mechanism behind such non-voluntary labor relationships. As a result, our 
approach is complementary to the above-mentioned models, as they describe different mechanisms 
that lock workers into the bonded labor institution. Moreover, our framework gives the opportunity 
to discuss the extent of the voluntary nature of the different bonded labor relationships and to 
compare them, and we show that this extent has important implications for policy. An important 
difference is that most of the models analyzing bonded labor incorporate multiple equilibria, i.e. 
they focus on how the landlord can act strategically to change conditions for all the laborers in the 
economy. Our approach differs, since we assess direct contracting between landlord and laborer as 
two individuals, and show that the bonding mechanism will not impact on other laborers’ contracts 
per se. This approach has strong empirical support, but is lacking in analytical work on bonded 
labor.  
 Despite an increasing focus on bonded labor, empirical investigations remain scarce. A very 
useful point of contrast between the villages we visited during our fieldwork was that they differed 
systematically in the degree of help they received from the government. Two villages were 
permanent settlements where the ex-Kamaiyas had been given substantial help, the most important 
contributions being ownership of a plot of arable land, a shared borehole with a water pump, tin and 
wood to build a house and schools built for their children. The three other villages were temporary 
settlements, and consisted of ex-Kamaiyas who had not received help from the Government or 
NGOs. As a result, the responses from the former type of village may yield important insights into 
how a liberation program should be designed since the respondents discussed the pros and cons of 
the Nepalese approach. However, this must be left to future research.2 On the other hand, responses 
from the latter types of village could shed light on whether the institution was voluntary or not since 
these can serve as a “treatment group” where the only policy intervention has been the effect of the 
ban on bonded labor. Comparing their well-being before and after liberation can thus shed light on 
the isolated effect of the ban, and this is one of the main topics of this paper. 
 In order to put a frame around our focus, a comment on slavery is necessary. There are some 
observations of slavery in the empirical literature on labor relations in poor rural areas. However, 
this institution is quite distinct from bonded labor since slaves are usually treated as capital goods, 
and can be considered to be the property of the employer (Ray 1998). In contrast, empirical 
evidence indicates that bonded labor is not traded. Moreover, there is probably no disagreement on 
the concepts and policies needed to implement the abolition of slavery, as it is illegal in every 
country in the world (www.anti-slavery.com). As a result, we will not go into this form of 
exploitation. 
 This paper is structured as follows: in the next section, we present some definitions and 
anecdotal evidence from the literature on different types of bonded labor. Then, in Section 3, we 
compare bonded labor to other long-term rural labor contracts, and in Section 4, we present our 
empirical results and analyze these in relation to the theories. Section 5 contains a simple model 
clarifying one mechanism that has not been modeled, which distinguishes bonded labor from other 
long-term labor contracts and voluntary servitude, and analyzes which of the types of relationship 
makes the laborer worst off. Section 6 discusses policy implications, and section 7 provides the 
conclusions. 
2. Definitions 
There seems to be considerable disagreement on the exact meaning of what constitutes “bonded 
labor”, and, in particular, whether these laborers find themselves in a voluntary relationship with the 
landlord. In this section, we start with the literature on definitions and empirical observations of 
bonded labor that undoubtedly stem from a voluntary relationship between the landlord and the 
bonded laborer. These descriptions of the laborers’ servility stem from the poverty of the workers; 
                                                     
2 A note on this is available from the author upon request. 
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they agree to subordination since this is in fact their best option. We therefore label these 
relationships poverty-induced subordination. Then, in section, 2.2, we discuss the literature that 
uses definitions and presents empirical descriptions of working relationships which are non-
voluntary, and start by proposing a new definition of forced bonded labor and an empirical test for 
this relationship. In the case of such forced work, the employer usually has some kind of power that 
is applied to keep the laborers servile. We therefore call these relationships power-induced bondage. 
2.1 Poverty-induced subordination 
One mechanism often claimed to be a source of bondage is the fact that the laborer takes a loan 
from the employer using his future labor services as collateral. Then, if the laborer is not able to 
repay the loan, he loses his collateral, and is deemed liable to work for the employer while having 
only his basic needs covered. This institution is called debt bondage, and Anti-Slavery International 
highlights the fact that many of these bonded labor relationships are caused by the poverty of the 
laborers: 
 
“Debt bondage is a system created by severe poverty and perpetuated by heredity. 
India, Pakistan, and Nepal are just some of the countries where debt bondage exists. 
For centuries, the destitute have pledged their own labor and that of family members as 
security against a loan - a loan usually taken out in a time of crisis. Tragically, the 
original sum is rarely paid off. Workers inevitably incur new debts for food, clothing, 
and shelter.” (www.anti-slavery.org) 
 
However, debt bondage created by the inability of a borrower to service his debt is not a 
new phenomenon. Bonded labor was defined by the United Nations in 1956 as:  
 
“the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal services or 
those of a person under his control as security for a debt, if the value of those services 
as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt or the length 
and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined”.3  
 
This definition applies to many of the descriptions of bonded labor by Anti-Slavery International 
(see www.anti-slavery.org). The literature tends to argue that the laborer is bonded because he has 
pledged his labor to the landlord for an open-ended period as security for the loan. Bardhan (1983) 
defines bonded labor as “a person who is tied to a particular creditor as a laborer for an indefinite 
period until some loan received in the past is repaid” (see also Busse and Braun 2003). However, 
the length of the period of the arrangement does not impact on whether it is a voluntary relationship 
since the discounted life-time value of the arrangement is used as a yard-stick. Moreover, taking a 
loan from the employer that needs to be repaid when the employee quits is also a common 
arrangement in developed countries, and is an option for the laborer and not a requirement for being 
employed. It is hard to argue that there are any non-voluntary aspects of this relationship between 
the lender and the borrower since future labor services can be pledged as collateral in the same 
voluntary manner as pledging a property as collateral, even if the former implies life-long laboring 
for the creditor. In the situation that the laborer has pledged his future labor as collateral and 
subsequently lost it, one can argue that he is ex-post unfree. This does not imply, however, that the 
relationship is non-voluntary, since the scenario of becoming unfree must have been a part of the 
laborer’s assessment when entering the loan contract. However, we reach the opposite conclusion if 
the children of the borrower are locked in a bonded labor relationship due to the heredity of the 
                                                     
3 Article 1 (a) of the UN Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and the Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery. 
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institution. It is clearly not the children’s choice at any point to enter the relationship, and hence, 
none of these children could take any alternative labor opportunities even if these were considerably 
better than being bonded labor. Moreover, this argument should not rest on whether the child 
accepts its inheritance, since children are often not able to make a realistic assessment of their future 
opportunities. Based on these arguments, we can assert that children entering bonded labor do this 
on a non-voluntary basis and would hence come into the category of power-induced bondage. 
 The view that the laborer enters the relationship voluntarily, and is subsequently bonded for 
the rest of his life, is mirrored in recent academic literature. Moreover, the voluntary nature of the 
relationships embedded in these definitions are not only highlighted in the presentation of the 
problem, but also operationalized in economic modeling. In a paper analyzing bonded labor, 
Genicot (2002) gives a good example of this perspective where it is the laborer’s deliberate choice 
to bond himself to the landlord:4 
 
“Interestingly, bonded labor is ex-ante voluntary. In the case of debt bondage, a tenant 
or debtor voluntarily places himself in a servile position, even though he may have 
little or no choice in the matter. Just as a serf is tied to his master by apparently 
voluntary acts of fealty, the bonded laborer is a technically free wage laborer whose 
state of servitude may be terminated on repayment of the debt (see Watson, 1976, p7). 
So, although once bonded, a worker is un-free, the act of choosing to be bonded is 
usually one freely made to avert acute poverty or starvation.” 
 
Another contribution to the perception that bonded labor is voluntary is provided by Schaffner 
(1995). She defines servility as laborers rendering their services to the landlord around the clock, 
being subordinated socially and even being involved in political activity in support of the landlord. 
Since there is a cost to the laborer of being servile, she argues that the landlord needs to compensate 
the bonded laborer in order to make them accept such subordination. However, being compensated 
in full for the negative aspects of the work indicates that such a relationship should be classified as a 
voluntary exchange. 
 Clearly, it is possible to make many individuals subject themselves to unwarranted treatment 
as long as the compensation is high enough, or their alternative options are worse. Sen (1984) 
argues similarly: 
 
“…the compulsion to acquire enough food may force vulnerable people to do things 
which they resent doing, and may make them accept lives with little freedom.” 
 
The same line of argument is found in a lawsuit organized by the Washington, D.C.-based 
International Labor Rights Fund against the American tire producer Firestone in Liberia in 2005. 
There, it was stated that the rubber plantation workers are modern day slaves, forced to work by the 
coercion of poverty, with the prospect of starvation just one complaint about conditions away 
(www.allafrica.com 2006). This type of working relationship, where workers are subjected to harsh 
treatment, with worse alternative options, highlights the importance of distinguishing between 
voluntary and non-voluntary labor relationships when it comes to policy intervention. Destitute 
people who render their services in exchange for some extra remuneration could find themselves in 
a difficult position if such opportunities were removed, especially in poor rural areas where seasonal 
income fluctuations may exacerbate their hardship. As a result, banning the relationship that enables 
people to acquire enough food may have severe implications for the welfare of these people, and, 
for example, if the Firestone plantation in the above example were closed down the workers would 
be worse off. When policies for poverty reduction are discussed, we seldom encounter arguments in 
favor of using the law to curb the problem. Similarly, when servility is induced by poverty, it is less 
likely that banning the institution would have a positive effect on the laborers. 
                                                     
4 For additional literature describing entry into bonded labor contracts as voluntary, see Srinivasan 1980 and 1989. 
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 Taken together, we suggest that if the laborer is rational and enters voluntarily into the 
bonded relationship, then the bonded labor relationship should be classified as a voluntary 
institution. In Section 3 we show that voluntary poverty-induced bondage as described in the 
literature is incorporated in existing concepts such as tied, permanent and attached labor. One 
important distinction is lacking, however. The literature does not usually differentiate between labor 
relationships where the laborer has pledged his future work as collateral to the landlord and 
subsequently lost it, and situations where the laborer has lost this collateral. The nature of those two 
working relationships is very different and requires a distinction, which we propose in section 4. 
2.2 Power-induced bondage 
In order to distinguish between voluntary and non-voluntary working relationships, we suggest that 
the term “bonded labor” is reserved for power-induced bondage. In Section 4, we relate bonded 
labor to other long-term working relationships. Our definition of bonded labor, which will be used 
subsequently in this article, is therefore as follows: 
 
• Bonded labor is a laborer that is coerced by the landlord into providing services for the 
landlord, with the result that not entering the relationship with the landlord would have been 
preferred from the laborer’s point of view. 
 
Our definition should clarify many of the observations where tied laborers and workers with credit-
labor interlinked contracts are mistakenly taken for non-voluntary bonded laborers. We also propose 
a simple test that will usually reveal whether the relationship can be categorized as bonded labor or 
not. Take the typical relationship which is often claimed to be bonded labor: a laborer has such a 
high debt that he is not able to repay the landlord and is therefore required to work for the landlord 
for the rest of the laborer’s lifetime. Now, whether this is a bonded relationship, or just an artifact of 
not having any other alternatives than to choose such a tied relationship, can be empirically tested 
by assessing the following counterfactual question:  
 
• Would the laborer be better off if the landlord had not used his power to lock-in the laborer? 
 
If the answer is yes, then the worker is a bonded laborer according to our definition. Counterfactual 
questions are usually difficult to answer, however, and we return to the empirical application of this 
test and its implications for policy in Sections 4 and 5.   
 Several anecdotes support our clarification that there are two main types of relationship 
included in the concept of “bonded labor” as used in the literature. As noted in the introduction, the 
countries with most bonded laborers have imposed a ban on bonded labor, and this seems to stem 
from a perception that the bonded laborers are forced into the relationship by the landlord. 
Similarly, the International Labor Organization defines bonded labor as forced work where the 
worker can be penalized for not complying5. 
 Looking at the observations in the field, we get a similar picture of landlords using power to 
force the bonded laborer to remain in servitude. The Anti-Slavery Organization states that some 
landlords keep false records of the bonded laborer’s debt, and this may be one mechanism that can 
force the laborers to remain with their particular landlord despite a better alternative option 
(www.anti-slavery.com). To see how such a worker can end up as a bonded laborer, assume that a 
                                                     
5 ILO’s Forced Labour Convention ILO Convention NO. 29, Article 2(1) defines forced labor as: “all work or service 
which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself 
voluntarily.” ILO published its first comprehensive report on forced labor in 2001. The report distinguishes between eight 
types of contemporary forced labor: (1) slavery and abduction for forced labor; (2) compulsory participation in public 
works; (3) coercive recruitment practices; (4) domestic workers in forced labor situations; (5) forced labor exacted by the 
military; (6) bonded labor or debt bondage; (7) trafficking in persons; and (8) prison labor. 
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laborer has agreed to take on a loan from a landlord on the condition that if he is not able to service 
the debt the laborer must render his future labor services to the landlord for a minimal 
compensation. If the landlord manipulates the debt up to an amount so large that the laborer is 
unable to repay, then the laborer is locked in a non-voluntary relationship with the landlord. If this 
situation is worse than his alternative options before taking on the loan, then the worker has become 
a bonded laborer. Observations by Breman (1974) in his anthropological study of southern Gujarat, 
India also suggest that manipulation of the debt is one approach for the landlord to lock-in bonded 
laborers: 
 
“For that matter, the landlords have it in their power to prevent repayment, and they do 
not shrink from wrongfully adding all kinds of expenses to the debt… A striking 
instance is that of a master who went to the hut of a Dubla servant to lecture him about 
his absence. On the way there he hurt his foot on a thorn, with the result that the 
Dubla’s account was debited with 5 rupees, the amount the master had spent on 
medicines. Another Dubla entered into marriage at the same time as his brother, and 
together they obtained 275 rupees from an Anavil (i.e., Brahmin of the landlord class). 
When, after three months, one of them died, the master charged the remaining brother 
with the total amount.” 
 
Rejecting the laborer’s repayment with the expectation that the loan may go to default later on, or 
the landlord’s practice of “wrongfully adding” his expenses to the laborer’s debt, can both be 
strategies to force laborers into bondage. Note, however, that when the brothers in the example take 
on a loan to cover marriage costs,  it need not be manipulation or coercion to demand that the 
brother repays the full amount of the loan if it was taken on with joint liability between the siblings. 
To the contrary, most banks will secure themselves against borrowers passing away by offering 
loans that impose the obligation to repay the full amount on those of the joint borrowers remaining 
alive. Most common, perhaps, are housing loans taken on by spouses, where if one dies the other 
must continue servicing the full loan. If this was the case in Breman’s anecdote, then the debtors 
may have taken this into account before entering the credit contract. If so, the expected advantage of 
taking on the loan must have been higher than abstaining from taking on the loan (i.e., their 
alternative option), and hence the worker cannot be categorized as a bonded laborer.  
 Other accounts of bonded labor relationships point in the same direction: some sort of 
manipulation of the credit contract traps the worker into bondage. Rudra (1982) describes bonded 
laborers, and how they enter this institution, in the following way:  
 
“There is such a phenomenon as some laborers being attached to certain employer 
families over years, sometimes over generations, in an unequal relation of mutual 
dependence, the basis of the relation being some loan taken a long time back. In such 
cases, quite often, both the parties have lost track of the loan accounts in terms of 
principal and interest, which accounts are in any case outrageous and total arbitrary. It 
is the non-significant part played by the loan accounts and the essential part played by 
the relation of personal dependence and personal domination which qualifies the 
coercive relationship as being extra-economic.” 
 
As a result, if the laborer is required to work for the employer and is being dominated on the basis 
of an amount of credit that has been arbitrarily changed by the employer, then this mechanism is in 
essence the same as in Breman’s accounts where the credit contract may be a pretext for acquiring 
cheap labor. On the other hand, if the laborer’s alternative options are worse than continuing in the 
relationship with the employer and playing along with the debt scheme, then the relationship is not 
classified as bonded labor. 
 To exemplify the exact distinction between the two types of bonded labor, assume that there 
are two laborers working for two different types of landlord, a normal landlord and a bondage 
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landlord, where the former behaves according to the law while the latter is willing to manipulate the 
contracts to grab some extra gain for himself. The particular type is not revealed to the laborer ex-
ante. Assume further that the laborer working for the normal landlord enters the relationship with 
the intent of binding himself to the landlord, and hence takes up debt above what can be repaid, and 
that the laborer working for the bondage landlord has the intention of being able to repay the debt in 
order to have the ability to enter another working relationship later on. Now, if the bondage landlord 
manipulates the debt upwards so that the laborer is not able to repay, then it is a very different 
relationship compared to the laborer staying with the normal landlord. Paralleling the situation to 
most other areas of commerce and trade, the former situation would be close to an ordinary 
transaction, while the latter could be a case for the judicial system to re-establish justice. 
 The ability of the strong party to change the alternative options of the weak party can clearly 
be important in deciding whether a transaction is voluntary or not. Basu’s (1990) example of a man 
asked for his wallet at gun-point is illustrative. He has the opportunity to decline, but few people 
would argue that the choice of parting with his wallet in this situation is a voluntary act. As a result, 
this cannot be claimed to be ex-ante voluntary and is clearly a different kind of situation to that 
described by Genicot (2002), quoted above, where the laborer chose to enter the relationship. Our 
example is more in line with Basu’s, where one option is removed from the weak party’s set of 
feasible alternatives: the man asked for his wallet no longer has the option of walking from the 
scene unhurt with his wallet, and the laborer no longer has the opportunity to get out of the 
relationship with the landlord after the laborer’s loan has been manipulated up to an amount so large 
that the laborer will never be able to repay it. 
 Clarifying the actual mechanisms that distinguish bonded labor from voluntary labor 
arrangements, such as tied labor and interlinked contracts, clearly has great importance for policy. 
Banning a voluntary labor institution, ceteris paribus, would usually leave the laborers worse off 
since they would otherwise have chosen the alternative they have to stick to after the ban. On the 
other hand, banning an institution where the laborers are trapped and in fact would escape if they 
could, will clearly improve the situation of this group. With this as a background, the fact that some 
emancipated laborers return to their landlord after they have been set free is more understandable. 
The simple explanation for this may be that they are poor people with no better option than to stay 
tied to the landlord. 
 Looking beyond the bonded labor literature, it is clear that what is often termed bonded labor 
can actually be defined by more common labor-credit interlinked contracts whose duration is very 
long term in nature. The relevant economic literature is discussed next. 
3. Literature review: long-term rural labor contracts 
and bonded labor 
3.1 Labor or credit contracts 
The economic literature on permanent labor arrangements focuses on personalized labor 
relationships usually lasting a year or more, and this type of contract is interchangeably called tied 
labor, estate labor, farm servant or attached worker. The two-tier labor market models analyze the 
co-existence of casual labor with permanent workers, and usually investigate the efficiency of such 
contracts and the role of each type in production. Bardhan (1979) shows that landlords may have 
incentives to offer such long-term contracts to avoid the costly recruitment of workers in the peak 
season, while Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) analyze how these 
contracts can give incentives for agricultural laborers to work effectively in the slack season. It is 
evident that much of the literature on long-term labor argues that these relationships can be 
efficient. 
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 The two-tier labor models emphasize that the laborer’s utility in the permanent labor 
relationship may be equal to or higher than the utility of being a casual worker (Ray 1998). Being a 
day-to-day worker is then taken to be the permanent laborer’s reservation position, and in order to 
prevent the permanent laborer from shirking, the landlord offers him a wage premium sufficiently 
high to make the loss of this job an unwarranted situation for the worker. Consequently, the 
permanent laborer is better off in this relationship compared to his feasible alternatives. Finally, 
permanent labor arrangements function as a substitute for insurance (Ray 1998). In terms of 
hardship, the permanent laborer will still have his daily minimum support from a landlord in 
contrast to the casual laborer who might be unemployed in this situation. As a result, all these two-
tier labor models indicate that the permanent laborer is at least as well off as in their alternative 
option, and the laborer is always free to choose this other option. We cannot, therefore, define these 
relationships as non-voluntary. Moreover, since there are many observations of bonded laborers 
who claim that they are worse off than in the alternative they would have if they were freed from 
the landlord, we need to go beyond the standard labor models to investigate the mechanisms of 
bonded labor. 
 Several authors raise the concern that there is more coercion in the actual relationship than is 
accounted for in the two-tier labor models. Bardhan (1991), Schaffner (1995) and Genicot (2002) 
emphasize that the traditional permanent labor models tend to conceal the power relations implicit 
in these labor relationships. Similarly, Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) argue that permanent labor is 
highly personalized and involves a high degree of patronage where the landlord demands total 
loyalty, but this is not incorporated into their model. One interesting contribution in which the 
employer’s power is explicitly taken into account in the modeling is provided by Schaffner (1995). 
Combining the power of the landlord with the laborers’ limited perception of the attractiveness of 
alternative labor opportunities gives the opposite result to that of the two-tier models: the permanent 
labor contracts need not be efficient, the laborers are bonded to their landlord and banning the 
institution could make the laborers better off. 
 Since Schaffner (1995) points to one interesting explanation for bonded labor it is worthwhile 
having a closer look at the actual mechanisms that bring about the results. The model incorporates 
the psychological findings that human beings’ attitudes and behavior depend on the perceptions and 
behavior of members of what is called a reference group, i.e. the group with which the individual 
identifies. As a result, the larger the number of members of a community that subordinate 
themselves under the landlord and behave in a servile manner, the lower the cost for a single 
individual of such behavior. Moreover, if the members of the group that is behaving in a servile 
manner do not fully appreciate that the behavior of the other members influences their own 
behavior, then there may be situations where no member breaks out of the group even if they all 
have knowledge of the better life lived by groups in other areas. Taking advantage of these 
perceptions, the landlord can isolate the laborers working for him and hence incur lower costs in 
making the laborers servile, compared to a situation where the laborers work among laborers who 
behave in a non-servile manner. Hence, the often observed requirement that the laborers must live 
on the landlord’s farm is important economically since it is in the landlord’s interest to limit the 
worker’s horizon. 
 The landlord’s mechanism for keeping the laborers trapped in the relationship, according to 
Schaffner (1995), is the fact that servile laborers are given a wage premium for accepting bad 
working conditions, unlike ordinary permanent laborers. Consequently, assuming that the laborers’ 
preferences do not depend on reference group behavior, if the market for servile services were to be 
eliminated, then the servile laborers would lose their wage premium and be at least as well-off as 
before. On the other hand, incorporating the fact that the laborers are not aware of the effects of the 
reference group perceptions may give the opposite result. If the laborers are unaware of the 
reference group effects, then they might find that the wage premium was too low compared to the 
available non-servile contracts. Banning servile labor contracts would then improve the well-being 
of the servile laborers.  
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 The implication of the model is quite interesting: servile laborers would reject being removed 
from the landlord in order to take the alternative option, but after having started to work as non-
servile laborer in a community without servility, they would realize that they were better off and 
would never return to their former servility. As a result, servile laborers in this model are defined as 
bonded laborers, according to our definition, when assessing the relationship from outside the 
relationship. Our proposed test would succeed in identifying these laborers as bonded laborers if the 
question of whether they would ever enter such a relationship is asked of those that are not in a 
servile relationship. However, the test fails to identify them as bonded laborers if applied to laborers 
who are in a servile working relationship with the landlord, since these workers believe that the 
alternative option is no better than what they already have. Clearly, this has important policy 
implications, to which we will return in section 5 below. 
 We now turn to the credit market since lending seems important in the bonded labor 
anecdotes presented in the previous section. It is evident that there is substantial risk involved in 
lending informally when the contracts are not enforceable and there is asymmetric information on 
the borrowers’ willingness and ability to repay a loan. To reduce this risk, a lender can demand 
collateral, and/or only lend to people whom he or she knows well, and can monitor or punish. These 
strategies help explain the monopolistic structure of lending, and why many laborers have their 
landlord as their sole provider of credit. However, as Basu (1997) points out in his overview of the 
literature on monopolistic rural credit markets, there are two approaches to modeling this exchange 
that have important implications for the outcome to the debtor. The first approach is to let the 
money lender use a “price strategy”, under which the terms of the loan are determined by a 
monopoly pricing strategy, while the second is to use a “reservation utility” strategy, under which it 
is the debtor’s willingness to pay that determines the terms of the offer. In the former, the debtor 
can get a surplus from the exchange, while in the latter the debtor can be rendered indifferent 
between accepting and rejecting the loan on the proposed terms. Hence, neither approach is capable 
of explaining bonded labor institution as defined in this article, where the debtor (laborer) is worse 
off in the relationship. 
 Even if standard credit models do not give any insight into bonding mechanisms, credit 
contracts may shed light on one mechanism that explains bonded labor. Badhuri (1977) illuminates 
the situations in which giving loans may be a cover for the landlord’s intention to acquire the 
collateral. In his model, a farmer pledges a loan from the landlord and uses his land, which is 
adjacent to the landlord’s property, as collateral. Consequently, the landlord values the farmer’s 
land more than the farmer in monetary terms, and situations may thus arise in which the value to the 
landlord of this collateral is higher than the value of the loan given to the laborer. If this is the case, 
then the landlord has an incentive to make the laborer default and could, for example, increase the 
interest rate in order to acquire the land. This mechanism can also be used to explain bonded labor 
relations if the laborer pledges his labor as collateral, and we explore this opportunity in Section 4 
below.  
3.2 Interlinking labor and credit contracts 
The laborers’ demand for credit plays a central role in the broad literature describing and analyzing 
the tight relationship between many landlords and laborers that has frequently been called “bonded 
labor”. The literature explaining the observed exchanges where credit and the labor contract are 
simultaneously agreed upon also shed light on the importance of separating bonded labor contracts 
from ordinary interlinkage contracts. 
 A subtle model in which the landlord uses interlinked contracts between credit and labor to 
bond the workers is proposed by Genicot (2002). In her model, the existence of bonded labor causes 
formal institutions to deny loans to the laborers since credit from the landlord may make it 
profitable for the laborer to renege on a loan from the formal credit institution. This, in turn, enables 
the landlord to keep the laborers in a relationship under which they would have been better off if the 
bonded labor institution had been banned. Since this model undoubtedly casts light on the 
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exploitation that some laborers are subjected to and the way in which the informality of the rural 
economy works to the disadvantage of the laborers, we discuss it in more detail.  
 To understand the mechanism that bonds the laborers in Genicot (2002), assume that the 
assetless laborer is able to take a loan, L, from a credit institution that is to be repaid during the next 
period. For fear of default, no formal credit institution will give new loans to the laborer. In general, 
the discounted value of the opportunity for the laborer to take a loan is given by g. The laborer is 
able to repay if his wage in the next period, w, is larger than the loan plus interest, r, and he is 
willing to repay if his utility from repaying is higher than his utility from reneging. Then the laborer 
will repay if the repayment constraint )())1(( wVgLrwV >++−  holds. Assume that this 
constraint is satisfied, so that the laborer would be granted a loan and that this would be repaid.  
 Assume now that a landlord enters the stage. The landlord is able to commit himself to 
offering a bonded labor contract in terms of which the laborer must work for him, getting, in 
addition to the ordinary wage, a loan L at a slightly higher interest rate than that of the formal 
lending institution.6 The landlord’s loan is given irrespective of the laborer’s past credit history with 
formal institutions, and the landlord can deduct the installments on the loan from the wage before 
paying it to the laborer. As a result, the landlord has some security for the repayment of the loan. If 
the discounted value for the worker of future loans of this type is y>0, which includes the 
disadvantage of bonding himself to the landlord and an interest rate higher than r, then this implies 
that the laborer has a better payoff from reneging as compared to a situation where bonded labor 
does not exist. This is evident from the repayment constraint, since the laborer can take a formal 
loan and then renege in order to enter a bonded labor contract and hence achieve V(w+y).  
 The formal credit institutions observe that the repayment constraint is now considerably 
altered, and note that if the landlord is able to lend on the same terms as the credit institution and 
give the laborer future loans that are valued to g, then the landlord is able to make an offer to the 
laborer so that the laborer will always default on the formal loan )())1(( gwVgLrwV +<++− . 
This implies that the formal lending institution will decline to lend, since it knows that the laborers 
will renege. Moreover, it is straightforward to show that there is a range of interest rates larger than 
r that the landlord can put on his loans and still make the laborer renege on the formal loan. Then, 
even if the landlord has an opportunity cost of funds that is higher than the market rate r, he can still 
make profits from supplying loans to the worker in a bonded labor contract. In equilibrium, there 
will thus be no formal lending since the credit institutions will see that all laborers will renege, and 
then all laborers will be bonded. Abolishing bonded labor will make the laborers better off since this 
implies that there will be lending from the formal institutions at more favorable terms than the 
higher interest rates in the bonded labor contract. 
 The interesting result from the model is the fact that the bonded labor contracts drive out the 
formal credit institutions, since no laborers will be eligible for a loan as long as it is in the 
landlord’s interest to make an offer, so that the laborer will renege on the formal loan. 
Consequently, the laborers end up in bonded labor contracts through which they pay a higher 
interest rate to the landlord than they would have paid to the credit institutions. This implies that 
banning bonded labor would induce the development of formal credit institutions that would render 
the laborers better off.  
 One could debate whether or not the landlord is using force in this situation, since he is 
merely using his economic power to propose a contract that destroys the competitiveness of the 
credit market. Nevertheless, since a laborer in the other community which has a moneylender has 
better terms on his loan, he would never enter a labor relationship of the kind offered by the 
                                                     
6 For a discussion of the consequences of relaxing this assumption, see Genicot (2002), p 123-125. It is evident that once 
the laborer has defaulted on the loan from the formal credit institution, it is in the landlord’s interest to offer a bonded 
labor contract that gives the laborer the same utility as working as a casual worker without credit opportunities. Then the 
laborer will never renege on the formal credit. The important issue here, however, is that the landlord is able to solve the 
commitment problem, by proposing a bribe, for example. However, this makes our simplified disposition more 
complicated than necessary. 
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landlord in Genicot’s model since this would leave him worse off. On the other hand, if assessed by 
a laborer who for some reason or another is stranded in that village, it may be that his best option is 
to work for the landlord. Then the relationship is deemed voluntary by our definition. 
3.3 Interlinking labor and product markets  
The interlinkage between labor and product markets has received far less attention than labor and 
credit interlinkage. However, in poor rural areas where there are monopolistic product markets, one 
can find variants of bonded labor relationships that are similar in subtlety to the mechanisms 
discussed in the previous sections. Basu’s (1986) path-breaking model shows that a landlord may be 
able to induce a merchant to deny a laborer access to the village shop unless the laborer accepts a 
wage below the market rate. The mechanism used to illustrate the landlord’s influence over the 
merchant, and hence the coercion mechanism vis-à-vis the laborer, is that the landlord is a bigger 
customer in the village shop and will refuse to buy anything from the merchant unless the merchant 
agrees to punish the laborer if the laborer rejects the landlord’s wage offer.7 
 Now, is the laborer in this model classified as bonded if subjected to our test? That depends 
on the ex-ante situation of the laborer and whether he is worse off after being subjected to the 
landlord’s threat by way of a third agent. If working for a landlord who does not use such threats is 
an option in the economy, while getting the market wage for the same job, then the laborer is clearly 
worse off when entering the labor relationship with the exploitative landlord. In this case, the 
worker is tied to the coercive landlord and this must be classified as power-induced bondage. 
However, if all landlords use the same threats, we need a more careful classification. On the one 
hand, we cannot define the relationship as bonded labor, since the laborer is not worse off in the 
relationship with a landlord as compared to his feasible alternatives. On the other hand, compared to 
a village where there are alternative shops, or where such threats are not used, we argue that a 
laborer would never have entered the relationship as described in the triadic model. As a result, in 
this case the laborer subjected to the triadic threat would be defined as a bonded laborer. 
 Interestingly, from the perspective of trying to disentangle the forces behind bonded labor, 
Basu’s model gives important insights into these relationships, since the landlord’s influence over 
the product market can be substituted by other channels of influence useful for bonding labor. 
Villanger (1999) provides a discussion of such possibilities, the basic finding being that the landlord 
locks the laborer into a bonded relationship by threats of denying the laborer other basic rights. In 
such a framework, which resembles the triadic model of Basu (1986), an illegal aspect of bonded 
labor frequently  surfaces when the landlord’s sources of power are scrutinized. 
 Taken together with empirical observations, there seems to be a gap in the literature 
explaining the mechanisms that trap workers into bonded labor. A landlord’s strategic lending with 
the purpose of acquiring the laborer’s future services should be scrutinized as one such mechanism. 
This is the purpose of the next section.  
4. Evidence from ex-Kamaiyas in western Terai 
4.1 Methodology and data 
We conducted in-depth interviews on labor and income relations with 54 ex-Kamaiyas who were 
living in 5 ex-Kamaiya camps in the district of Kailali in Terai in the far-western region of Nepal 
during April and May 2006. This district was chosen because the Kamaiya system used to be 
prevalent in this region, and because several camps for ex-Kamaiya had been established there after 
the liberation. Fortunately for our study, there were important differences between the camps. Three 
                                                     
7 See Hatlebakk (2002) for an elaboration on the robustness of this approach. 
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of the camps were temporarily settled on occupied land that was owned by the government, and 
these had not been given any help from the government or NGOs. Consequently, the opportunity to 
assess the sole effect of a ban and whether or not it was better for the Kamaiya to be emancipated 
from their landlords was close to ideal. The situation resembles a natural experiment in that it seems 
to us that the only “treatment” that these people got was that they were freed and could go for 
alternative employment.8 The other two camps were permanent camps where the ex-Kamaiyas had 
been granted the land, which was documented by a land-ownership certificate, and also received a 
range of other measures of support (see the appendix for more information on this aid). 
 To reduce errors of recall, we asked the respondents to list the villages where they9 had been 
living in the past, and the names of the landlords that they worked for in that village. For each 
landlord we asked detailed questions about working conditions, remuneration, whether the landlord 
was good or bad and whether he punished them for various reasons. Detailed questions were then 
asked about the community they lived in at that time, especially on labor opportunities. Then we 
asked why the respondents had moved to the next landlord, and why at this point they did not take 
on or consider daily labor instead of entering another Kamaiya contract. 
 We started out interviewing in the two permanent ex-Kamaiya camps. All the respondents 
said that their situation was much better now than before, and that the government ban had been a 
great success. We struggled to get reasonable comparisons of a Kamaiya contract with an 
alternative labor contract before liberation, and for the purpose of this paper we have chosen to 
focus on the ex-Kamaiyas in the three camps where no one had received any help. In Table 1 below 
we provide an overview of our categorization of the responses in these camps as to why the 
respondents did not change to daily labor or take on other labor opportunities at the time when they 
were Kamaiyas for a particular landlord. Note that the total number of interviews in these three 
camps was 28, so the larger number of experiences reported in Table 1 is due to the fact that several 
of the respondents had different experiences with different landlords.  In the next section, we go 
deeper into each of the categories and discuss the responses with respect to the relevant theories. 
 
Table 1. Number of responses in each category, temporary camps on occupied land 
Location 
 
Category 
Geta temporary camp 
Jeetalpur temporary camp 
Milanpur temporary camp 
Sequestering 6 
Loan as a lock-in mechanism 2 
Large start-up costs of moving 2 
No daily labor opportunities in surrounding areas 9 
Kamaiya better than the alternatives 10 
Manipulation of contracts 5 
Social bonds between family members in the community 2 
Sum experiences 35 
 
 
                                                     
8 However, most ex-Kamaiyas in Nepal did receive help from the government. Hence, if it were those ex-Kamaiyas that 
were less able to fight for government resources that were not helped, then we may expect that the three villages consist of 
people who would be more prone to landlords’ manipulation and use of power than the average ex-Kamaiya. In that case 
our results overstate the true degree of misuse of power and the degree of non-voluntariness in an average Kamaiya 
relationship. However, we also did fieldwork in two villages where the ex-Kamaiyas had received substantial help, and it 
is not our impression that the situation differs systematically between the inhabitants in the two types of village. 
9 Kamaiyas could be both women and men. Usually, the Kamaiya contract was established between the landlord and the 
husband of the family, but the terms would often include the labor and services of the spouse. 
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4.2 On the voluntary nature of the Kamaiya relationship: Must I stay 
or could I go? 
In this section we will summarize the responses to our questions on whether being a Kamaiya was 
better than the feasible alternatives, and refer to the most important reasons for their assessment. It 
is evident that there were many different experiences among the Kamaiyas. However, it is important 
to note that the ex-Kamaiyas in the temporary camp in Milanpur all had small plots (0.03 – 0.06 
hectares) on which they could grow some maize, vegetables, wheat and paddy. As a result, when 
discussing what was better – life as Kamaiyas or the alternative options – this opportunity probably 
influenced their answers, even though our aim was to elicit their assessment of the two options at 
the time when they were Kamaiyas. In this village, all but one respondent said that the free life was 
better than the Kamaiya relationship. On the contrary, 50 % (9 out of 18) of those in the two other 
temporary camps who were able to assess whether being a Kamaiya was better than the alternative 
options stated that they were better off as Kamaiyas. Two main reasons emerge for why the 
Kamaiya contract was preferred. Firstly, they stated that the landlord provided them with a house of 
good quality, and compared it to the low-quality house that they were living in after emancipation. 
On the latter issue, it is worth noting that they had settled illegally on government-owned land, and 
could thus be evicted. Consequently, they probably would not put very many resources into 
developing their houses, due to this uncertainty. However, if the objective is to assess only the 
effect of a ban, then one must expect that the ex-Kamayias would settle on occupied land, since they 
did not have any resources with which to buy a plot. This makes these ex-Kamaiyas’ self 
assessment of their welfare situation before and after liberation particularly valuable for our 
purpose, including their assessment of the housing issue. 
 The second reason why being a Kamaiya was preferred to alternative options was that they 
were food-secure in that relationship. Several respondents stated that they were “able to eat a lot” as 
a Kamaiya, and that they now “often had to go hungry to bed”. One of the respondents illustrated 
the resentment that some of them felt after liberation: “The Kamaiya system was better. Now we 
have no land and no food in the house. Government freed the Kamaiya without a plan, the 
government took the wrong decision.” 
 We also asked for an assessment from those who stated that the alternative options were 
better than the Kamaiya relationship. Three major reasons emerged, and the first was that they had 
to work very hard for long periods of time as Kamaiyas. One respondent stated that she did not even 
get time to care for her child after it was born, but had to return to work very quickly. Another 
respondent said that the landlord fined her Rs. 1400 for taking two days off to go for family 
planning, an amount equivalent to her income from working more than 18 days. Similarly, several 
of these ex-Kamaiyas said that they had to work so long that they did not get enough sleep at night. 
The second reason was that the landlord beat the Kamaiyas, harassed them or shouted at them or 
used other forms of debasement and punishment. The third reason was that they were very seldom 
allowed to go to other places, including making visits to relatives. Interestingly, when we asked 
why landlords whom they categorized as “bad” got new Kamaiyas, they stated that those who chose 
to go to a bad landlord did not know that he was bad and that these Kamaiya often came from far 
away. This is a feature of the Kamaiya system to which we will return in Section 5. 
 One respondent clearly stated that it was better to be a Kamaiya at the time when he started in 
the relationship, compared to other labor contracts. He started out as a wage laborer, but often he 
did not get any work. After that he tried rickshaw pulling, but the work was so hard that he became 
ill, and the pay was low. Then he turned to being a Kamaiya, and he agreed when asked if he chose 
this contract because the terms of other feasible contracts were worse. Moreover, the respondent 
stated that the landlord was a very good person, that he never shouted and that he provided food for 
all the children. Another respondent stated that when several members of his caste and family 
moved from sharecropping contracts in Dang to become Kamaiya in Tigary, he decided to move 
with them and join as a Kamaiya. When asked to assess which of the situations were best, he stated 
that it was better to be a Kamaiya since this implied less work than the sharecropping contract did. 
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This is interesting, since it seems to represent the opposite view of many of the other ex-Kamaiyas 
in that sharecropping seems to be preferred. Moreover, one would expect that the sharecropper 
would not work as hard as a Kamaiya since the tenant himself decides how much labor to use in the 
former contract, while the landlord decides on the labor input in the latter contract. However, if the 
sharecropping plot was very small or the land of inferior quality, then the need to increase the use of 
labor to get a sufficient outcome from the land may be one explanation for this response.10 
 Finally, a few respondents were not able to compare the different relationships, and some said 
that their situation as Kamaiya was the same as in the alternatives. They stated that after liberation 
they often did not have enough food, while before liberation they had to work very long hours. All 
the respondents were asked why they did not take alternative employment when they were 
Kamaiya. The reasons that they gave are categorized below. 
4.3 Categorizing reasons for remaining Kamaiya when the 
alternatives were better 
In this section we categorize the different reasons that the respondents gave for why they remained 
in the Kamaiya relationship prior to emancipation if this contract was perceived to be inferior to 
alternative labor arrangements. However, it was difficult for some of the respondents to visualize 
their new situation if they were to break out of the Kamaiya relationship and take alternative labor 
options. In these cases we drew on the fact that they had not received any help from the 
government, NGOs or others after emancipation. We asked them, therefore, to compare the life they 
lived as Kamaiya with the life they were living at the time of the interview. We discuss these 
reasons for remaining a Kamaiya in relation to the theoretical explanations of bonded labor and 
discuss the degree of freedom that the Kamaiyas experienced. 
4.3.1 Sequestering 
Some respondents in Geta clearly indicated that they did not know about the opportunity to repay 
their debt, or refinance, and subsequently take on daily labor. Others stated that they did not think 
that they had this choice, and that it was in the Kamaiya nature to remain in such a relationship. 
This pattern supports the sequestering model of Schaffner (1995), and one respondent clearly 
indicated that such forces were at play. She stated that she did not know of the daily wages, did not 
think about that at all, and was never given the opportunity to visit other places to learn of such 
options due to the working requirements. Three independent respondents in Jeetalpur support this 
perspective. They stated that their situation had improved after liberation, and one reason was that 
they now were free to go wherever they wanted. When they were Kamaiyas, they were not allowed 
to go anywhere, except to visit relatives once a year. One ex-Kamaiya said that if they asked the 
landlord for permission to go somewhere, he replied that they first had to repay their loan. 
Moreover, one of these respondents stated that the landlord’s reason for sequestering them was the 
fear that they would escape, and one interpretation of this is that “escape” means to take up an 
alternative position, away from the landlord. The other respondent stated that the landlord feared 
that the Kamaiya would become cleverer from visiting other areas, would understand the inferiority 
of the Kamaiya contract and then leave for other options. Consequently, if the respondent was right 
in that the sequestering was a deliberate choice by the landlord to hide feasible working options for 
the Kamaiya, then this pattern is in close accordance with Schaffner (1995). Similarly, another 
respondent said that the Kamaiya did not have the thinking power to think of taking on daily wages, 
and also stated that, while talking about this to the interviewer, it made him sad that he did not move 
to take on daily wages when he was a Kamaiya. This indicates that he was not aware of the 
opportunity at the time. 
                                                     
10 There is a large literature on sharecropping, and several explanations for the ex-Kamaiyas’ assessment could be 
discussed. However, that is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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4.3.2 The role of credit 
A few respondents (2) indicated that there was no opportunity to repay the loan other than letting 
other landlords repay in the situation of transferring them from one to another landlord. In this case, 
the loan acts as a lock-in mechanism, since the Kamaiya could never break out of the relationship 
and take on daily wages unless it was approved by the landlord.  One respondent, who had started 
rickshaw pulling after liberation, was asked why he did not quit the Kamaiya contract and start 
rickshaw pulling before liberation. He replied that he had loans to the landlord and earned too little 
to feed his family – hence there were no opportunities to repay even a relatively small loan. 
However, there were possibilities for borrowing from relatives and repaying the loan, and many 
loans were not that high in comparison to their income. As a result, if the terms of alternative labor 
options were better, many of the Kamaiyas should have been able to repay their loan. Even if the 
loan was a hindrance for some in ending the relationship with the landlord, it seems to us that the 
loan in itself did not act as a general barrier against breaking out of the relationship.  
 Moreover, Genicot (2002) predicts that implementing a ban should lead to alternative credit 
relations flourishing, since the landlords gave incentives for the Kamaiyas to renege on their loans 
to other creditors. However, it was almost six years since liberation at the time of interviewing the 
ex-Kamaiyas, and only three of the respondents had a loan. This is in stark contrast to the situation 
before liberation, where almost all the respondents reported having a loan. At the time of 
interviewing, one ex-Kamaiya had a loan from the shop where he was working, one from his father-
in-law and one from a village savings group. Even if a full analysis of the predictions of Genicot 
(2002) would require a survey more focused on credit relations than that which we conducted, it is 
our impression that the ex-Kamaiyas were largely credit rationed after liberation, except in 
Milanpur, where a village credit group was established. However, if the village credit group was 
established and subsidized by NGOs, which was the case for many village credit groups in the area, 
then our interviews suggest that the predicted rise in alternative credit schemes did not occur. 
4.3.3 Large start-up costs 
Two ex-Kamaiyas living in Milanpur after liberation stated that the risk of moving to the nearest 
place where daily labor was available led to great uncertainty. They stated that it was impossible to 
move to the city when they did not have any relatives or housing there. Interestingly, Milanpur is 
located 20 minutes walking distance from the local municipality, Dhangadhi, and it is our 
impression that this was a particularly attractive area in which to settle down. Moreover, there had 
been substantial quarreling between the neighbors and the ex-Kamaiyas over the use of the land 
when the latter settled in this area. Consequently, the responses from these two ex-Kamaiyas might 
indicate their own experiences - that these two may have had someone who helped them move to a 
particular attractive area on disputed land, and they were therefore able to overcome what was 
perceived by them as being a barrier. 
4.3.4 No daily labor opportunities in surrounding areas 
Nine of the respondents said that there were no daily labor opportunities in surrounding areas, and 
that they did not consider there to be any alternatives to being a Kamaiya. One reason for the lack of 
other labor contracts seems to be the fact that the landlords used Kamaiyas for the labor they 
needed, and therefore the Kamaiyas would need to travel quite a distance to seek other 
opportunities. As a result, the lack of alternative labor opportunities in the community created by 
the Kamaiya system probably acted to preserve the Kamaiya system itself. 
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4.3.5 Social bonds 
Only two respondents indicated that the Kamaiyas were not willing to move far away from their 
families and relatives. One of them stated that when several members of his caste and family moved 
from the community to become Kamaiya, he decided to move with them and join as a Kamaiya. 
Moreover, it was indicated that some Kamaiyas had social bonds with the landlord and it was 
suggested that this played a role. This was confirmed by another respondent who stated that he was 
very sad at the time of liberation and did not want to leave the landlord, even if life as a free worker 
was better than being a Kamaiya. When asked why he was sad to leave the landlord if life as a free 
worker was better, he responded that he had a good relationship with the landlord and that “he loved 
me a lot”. In this case, it seems that the strong social bond with the landlord played a role in keeping 
the Kamaiya in the relationship, even if taking alternative work would yield a more comfortable life 
with less work.11 
4.3.6 Manipulation of contracts 
Several respondents said that they had experienced or heard stories about landlords manipulating 
the terms of the Kamaiya contract, and the most common approach was that the landlord wrote 
down a different figure from what was given as a loan. One respondent stated that her landlord 
added a zero after the amount that was lent – so that a loan of Rs. 100 became Rs. 1000. A telling 
example of the extra benefit that may accrue to the landlord from this approach is the landlord who 
had given one of the Kamaiya respondents a loan of Rs. 1100 during a year. At the end of the year, 
the Kamaiya wanted to move from that landlord. However, the landlord wanted them to stay and 
claimed that the loan had now increased to Rs. 11,000. Clearly, not even the highest observed 
informal interest rates can explain such an increase during a period of one year. Interestingly, the 
respondent was very clear in that the manipulating the debt upwards occurred at the time they stated 
that they wanted to leave the landlord, and that the landlord’s motive for this behavior was to keep 
them as his Kamaiyas. Another respondent told us that one of his relatives had a debt of Rs. 50,000 
to Rs. 100,000 when working as Kamaiya, and suggested that the debt had been manipulated up to 
such a high level. In this case, it was almost impossible to find a landlord willing to pay that amount 
to let the Kamaiya change landlords. As a result, the Kamaiya was permanently trapped in the 
relationship. 
 Two explanations for this manipulation arise. The first and obvious is that this manipulation 
of the debt is purely an extra income source to the landlord since the new landlord will pay for the 
Kamaiya’s debt. The second is more subtle. There must be an upper limit at which the new landlord 
will decline to take the Kamaiyas. Hence, increasing the loan as much as possible without it being 
revealed could serve as a mechanism to keep the Kamaiyas trapped in the relationship with the 
landlord. Moreover, this approach to keeping the laborers in servility has clearly been overlooked in 
the literature that discusses bonded labor concepts. In the next section, we develop a model to 
explain the conditions for when such a strategy is useful for bonding laborers, and use this to 
discuss principles for interventions against bonded labor.  
                                                     
11 In one of the two permanent ex-Kamaiya camps, one of the respondents actually invited his ex-landlord to come and 
stay at his place for a couple of days every year, and also gave him meals. This is a good example of the strong social 
bonds that could arise in these feudal institutions.  
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5. An informal model of manipulation of loans as the 
mechanism to bond laborers 
Based on the responses of the ex-Kamaiyas who had loans that were manipulated upwards, we shall 
develop a new explanation for bonded labor, using the ideas of Bhaduri (1977). We believe that this 
model reveals an important mechanism landlords can use to subordinate workers. Assume that the 
laborer is in need of a loan and that there are two sources of credit. In an emergency, the laborer can 
borrow an amount from friends and relatives, but assume that this entails poor people selling their 
dearest possessions, and is thus an option of last resort. Call this the emergency loan. The other 
source of credit is taking a loan from the landlord that the laborer is working for, where the landlord 
and the laborer agree on a constant annual interest rate. 
 Furthermore, it is agreed that the laborer renders his lifetime labor and servility as collateral. 
In case of default, the laborer must not only work for a minimum level of support for the rest of his 
life, but must also subordinate himself to the landlord in every way. This minimum level of support 
is usually basic food and shelter requirements. The subordination may imply that the laborer must 
be of service whenever the landlord wishes, that he must support the landlord in political campaigns 
and elections, and that he is confined to the landlord’s property. Let a laborer who has entered such 
a loan contract with the landlord and subsequently lost this collateral, and is therefore subjected to 
the landlord on the described terms, be called a tied laborer. A laborer that has not lost his collateral 
can be called an attached worker since his working conditions are in line with the freedom usually 
assumed in two-tier labor markets (i.e. freedom to change employer, freedom to travel outside the 
landlord’s farm, and the freedom not to be servile). Note that the literature uses attached and tied 
labor interchangeably. However, it is clear that the type of labor relationship before and after the 
laborer has lost his collateral is very different and warrants dissimilar terms. 
 Assume for simplicity’s sake that only four components matter to the laborer: (1) the 
discounted net value to the worker of his labor during the remaining life span; (2) the value of the 
credit contract; (3) the discounted value of avoiding the loss of status and the humiliation of being 
subordinated to the landlord; and (4) the eventual benefits of having lifetime support as a tied 
laborer. Now, let the laborer value a free life as an attached worker more than defaulting on the loan 
from the landlord and becoming a tied laborer. 
 However, the laborer knows that there are two types of landlord, either the type that prefers to 
have him as a tied laborer or the type that prefers to have him as an attached worker. The exact type 
is revealed to the laborer after the contract is agreed upon. Consequently, the laborer knows that the 
landlord could be more interested in having him as a tied laborer rather than an attached worker, 
and that there may be unforeseen events that make repayment impossible. In order for the laborer to 
be sure of not ending up as a tied laborer, he will never take a loan that is larger than the emergency 
loan, so that last resort borrowing from friends and relatives can be used to pay off the loan from the 
landlord in the event of the laborer not being able to service the loan. 
 The landlord, on the other hand, values (1) the laborer’s lifetime work; (2) the subordination 
and servility of a tied laborer; (3) the discounted cost of providing a lifetime’s minimum support to 
a tied laborer; and (4) the value of the credit contract. A landlord prefers to get the loan repaid only 
if the net value of the joint credit and labor contract of the attached working relationship is larger 
than the net value of having the worker as a tied laborer, where the latter includes the costs of 
providing the minimum level of support. Now, an interesting scenario emerges if the laborer is 
dealing with a landlord of the type that values the servility services of the tied laborer more than he 
values an attached labor relationship with the associated credit contract. This implies that it is in the 
landlord’s interests that the laborer should default on the loan. Note first that if the contracts were 
perfectly enforceable and not open to manipulation, then the laborer would remain in an attached 
working relationship with the landlord, since the laborer by definition is better off in rejecting offers 
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of being a servile worker. So even if the laborer had difficulties in servicing the loan if unforeseen 
events occurred, he could always terminate the loan by using the emergency credit. 
 However, contracts in poor rural areas are usually not enforceable, especially when the strong 
party deviates from the agreement. Assume therefore that the landlord increases the loan size above 
the contracted level so that the laborer is not able to pay the installments. As a result, if the laborer 
is not able to repay the loan by using the emergency loan, as indicated by the empirical anecdotes 
above, then the loan will go to default if the installments are sufficiently high. In this case, the 
laborer becomes a bonded laborer and his situation is worse than if he were an attached worker. He 
is locked in by the debt, however, as the landlord has made sure that the laborer is trapped in the 
relationship. This scenario explains how laborers can be forced into a non-voluntary working 
relationship, and hence become bonded according to our definition. The explanation also gives an 
additional reason as to why we observe high interest rates in poor rural areas. The rates are high 
because the landlords try to make the borrowers default, in order to force them into bonded labor 
relationships. 
 A similar strategy that the landlord may apply is to increase the amount of the loan to a level 
where the laborer is not able to service the debt. This scenario provides another explanation for such 
manipulation rather than the often suggested motive that the landlord wants to have a larger pay-off 
from the lending scheme. The reason for using all possible means to increase the debt is to make the 
laborer default, so that the attractive bonded labor services become available to the landlord. The 
empirical evidence given in the section above indicates that there are frequent observations of the 
landlord manipulating the laborer’s debt upwards, and this supports such an explanation for bonded 
labor. 
 It is clear that poverty and highly fluctuating income and needs without insurance 
arrangements can drive a laborer into preferring the tied labor contract. Consequently, if the tied 
labor contracts provide the laborer with food security in situations of highly fluctuating food prices, 
or medicines when needed, it is easy to see that the assumption that the laborer prefers the attached 
labor contract may not hold. In this situation, the laborer enters the subordinate position voluntarily, 
and becomes a tied laborer if the loan for some reason or another goes to default. Our model 
therefore distinguishes between two types of servile labor relationship, even if the observable states 
and terms of work at a single point in time for these two laborers are identical. The difference is 
whether the landlord used his position to manipulate the contract in order to make the laborer 
subordinated, and whether this resulted in a lower level of well-being for the laborer as compared to 
not becoming a bonded laborer. 
6. Policy discussion  
Some of the latest interventions aimed at emancipating what is termed “bonded labor” illustrate the 
dichotomy in the use of the term “bonded labor”. The liberation in Nepal, to which the UN 
International Labor Organization was a major contributor,12 provided the emancipated “bonded 
laborers” with a piece of land on which they could both cultivate their own crops and build a house. 
As a result, many laborers had better alternative options available than before liberation. Despite 
this, it was observed that some emancipated “bonded laborers” returned to the same landlords that 
they were emancipated from (anti-slavery.org). As noted above, this phenomenon has also been 
observed in other countries. 
 There are at least two plausible explanations for the return of “emancipated” laborers to their 
landlords. Firstly, if their relationship with their landlord is voluntary, then they will return if their 
welfare as an “emancipated” laborer is lower than before “emancipation”. One plausible 
                                                     
12 The ILO program “Sustainable elimination of bonded labour in Nepal” was implemented from 2001 to 2005. See 
www.ilo.org for more information about the project. 
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explanation following from this line of argument is that the attached relationship with the landlord 
may give the laborer a minimum level of support that acts as an insurance against times of hardship, 
while the situation after “emancipation” entails high fluctuations in consumption and lower welfare. 
This is the standard insurance argument for attached labor, and our fieldwork on the liberation of 
the Kamaiyas supports the notion that this may often be an important motive for remaining with the 
landlord.   
 The second explanation, which is derived from our model, applies if the landlord has the 
means to coerce the laborer. In this case, the landlord may use the same power as he used when 
bonding the laborer in order to make the laborer return as a bonded laborer. Interpreting our model 
literally, however, would imply that improving access to alternative credit arrangements from 
independent sources would remove the landlord’s opportunity to bond the laborer. Now, it is 
important not to underestimate traditional power relations between these individuals in the rural 
economy. Another example of manipulative approaches is that the laborers are given the right to 
build a house on the landlord’s ground. Eviction threats may in turn be used against the laborers in 
order to make them accept servility (Villanger 1999). Even though new credit opportunities and a 
contract-dispute resolution institution would remove one kind of power from the landlord, and 
hence make an important contribution towards eliminating this institution, the literature suggests 
that landlords may have different kinds of power for bonding laborers. This may play an important 
role in explaining why some laborers return to their landlord after being emancipated from the 
relationship. Below, we discuss two different sources of the landlords’ power from the above-
mentioned literature –limiting the laborers’ horizon and undermining their credit opportunities - and 
we suggest some additional policy interventions. 
 Note first, however, that our model indicates that banning bonded labor can be an effective 
tool in improving the well-being of some of the most disadvantaged people. Nevertheless, as our 
fieldwork emphasizes, some will gain and some will lose from such a ban. The lesson from the 
model is that a ban on bonded labor and improving opportunities for laborers by using formal 
written contracts could be important in abolishing bonded labor. Moreover, a lesson learned from 
the empirical evidence is that many of the ex-bonded laborers must be helped to overcome 
volatilities in consumption due to their insecure labor situation after liberation, and they also need 
help in constructing a proper house. Both NGOs and more formalized public training facilities could 
play an important role in educating laborers on all of these matters, as BASE did in Nepal, for 
example (Hatlebakk 2006). Where there is a suspicion of manipulation of contract terms, or plain 
disagreement about these, there should be a contract dispute resolution  service, perhaps integrated 
into the court system.  
 One implication of the theories of bonded labor is that the alternative option may determine 
whether or not the worker is defined as a bonded laborer, and hence, the counterfactual question 
becomes crucial. The usefulness for policy interventions of distinguishing bonded labor from other 
types of labor contract may be limited when it is difficult to assess their actual alternative options, 
and what their situation would be without the bonded labor system. The first example arises in 
situations as described by Schaffner (1995), in which servile laborers reject being emancipated from 
the landlord due to their limited horizons. As a result of these, they claim that the alternative option 
is as bad as their current situation. Consequently, if policymakers do not have insight into the 
psychology of the laborers, they may have a hard time implementing a ban which is opposed by 
those it is supposed to help. This is confirmed by several of our respondents in that they state that 
they did not know about the alternatives to the Kamaiya system. 
 It is evident from Schaffner’s model, however, that after having started to work as non-servile 
laborers in a community without servility, they would realize that they are better off and would 
never return to subordination to their landlords. In this scenario, the landlords can exploit workers 
who are not conscious of reference group effects by limiting their horizons – i.e. by actively shaping 
the workers’ social interactions so as to strengthen the forces that contribute to reference group 
perceptions. This has two implications. The first is that even though a proposed ban would be 
opposed by the bonded laborers as well as the landlords, it would improve the well-being of the 
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laborers once implemented. The challenge is to reveal the fact that the bonded labor relationship is 
in fact worse than the alternative made possible by a ban, and this entails using information from 
people who are well informed about both alternatives. The second implication is that policies that 
improve the mobility of the laborers (improved public transport, new roads, access to 
telecommunications and so on) would reduce the effect and make it more difficult for the landlord 
to exploit the laborers’ limited horizons. 
 The second example of the difficulty in using the alternative option mechanically as a 
yardstick for determining whether the laborer is bonded arises from situations where the bonded 
labor system reduces the welfare of all the laborers in the economy, as for example in Genicot 
(2002). It is difficult to draw welfare and policy implications in practice when the bonded labor 
system has undermined alternative credit opportunities, since the bonded laborers in this scenario 
have the same well-being as those on the outside, as neither of them have alternative credit 
opportunities. However, using our test slightly differently reveals that this model operates with a 
similar bonded labor definition as in our model. Assessing the counterfactual (i.e. what would the 
laborers’ well-being have been without the opportunity for the landlord to prevent the entry of credit 
institutions) gives the result that in some situations the bonded laborers would have been better off 
without the bonded labor institution. However, aggregated economic power in the hands of the 
landlords and the absence of other moneylenders should act as a warning sign that this type of 
bonded labor institution is in play. 
 It may seem odd to ban the contracts described by Genicot (2002), where the landlord is 
doing nothing other than competing in the labor-credit market, trying to come up with an offer so 
valuable to the laborer that he would choose to both work and take a loan from the landlord. In 
more developed markets, we observe employers that give loans to their employees as long as they 
stay in that particular work relationship. Supposedly, such lending is meant to make the employee 
stay in the relationship from a profit motive, which is identical to the landlord’s intention in this 
model. It follows that the argument in favor of banning bonded labor in Genicot’s model should be 
focused on removing barriers to the entry of alternative credit providers. This argument is similar to 
anti-trust regulation in richer countries: the aim is not to punish monopolists for wrong behavior, 
but to ensure that new competitors have the opportunity to enter the market in order to improve 
efficiency. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper reviews the literature that focuses on bonded labor and related phenomena, proposes a 
new framework to improve our understanding of the extent of the voluntary nature of these 
relationships and presents new evidence from ex-Kamaiyas in Nepal in order to discuss the nature 
of these relationships. Previously, bonded labor has been used as a broad concept covering both 
voluntary relationships, similar to those described in models of permanent labor, and more coercive 
working relationships, in which the landlord uses manipulation, coercion, market power or other 
strategic methods to bond the workers. However, since the policy implications of emancipating 
bonded labor can be very different if the relationships are voluntary, and since there are several 
models that explain these types of permanent working relationship, we have concentrated on 
distinguishing between voluntary and non-voluntary working relationships. We have used evidence 
from others as well as our own empirical research to define bonded labor as a labor relationship in 
which the worker is trapped with the landlord due to the latter party’s use of power. The important 
feature of the model is that a bonded laborer is one who would never have entered the relationship if 
he had been given the choice. Consequently, the bonded laborer’s alternative option is, in fact, their 
preferred choice. 
 Our simple model highlights the profitability for the landlord of bonding laborers. This model 
explains the co-existence of two types of relationship, both alleged to be bonded, highlights their 
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important differences, and brings out some clear policy recommendations for each of them. Firstly, 
the voluntary labor relationships, i.e., attached labor, need to be combated in the same manner as in 
ordinary anti-poverty programs for generating higher incomes. Secondly the non-voluntary bonded 
labor institution needs to be addressed in two ways. Since the outside option is the preferred choice, 
it is important that the government makes sure that the laborer is able freely to choose that option. 
This involves legal measures in the rural areas, including judicial help to illiterate people in 
developing and sustaining contracts for labor and credit relationships, and information about 
workers’ rights. The other route is to focus on keeping the emancipated laborers away from the 
landlord and not letting themselves be captured again, and to let them learn about alternative 
options. In this way, both the provision of alternative credit and the stability of the alternative 
options’ income opportunities should be enhanced. 
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Appendix: A description of the different ex-Kamaiya 
temporary camps 
Help received in all villages: the most important contributions were ownership of a plot of arable 
land, a shared borehole with a water pump, tin and wood to build a house, village roads and 
drainage and schools built for their children. 
 
Geta camp (VDC ward Geta-2): Temporary, on occupied land owned by the government, 110 
households in the camp, of whom 11 were interviewed - chosen on a random basis. Bus service 
nearby, electricity running through but not utilized by any residents, one water pump to share for 
the village as a whole. Most land was not suitable for tilling, but small vegetable garden plots 
existed. 
 
Milanpur camp (Dhangadhi-5): Temporary, on occupied land owned by the government, 58 
households in the camp, of whom 8 were interviewed - chosen on a random basis. Bus service 
nearby, electricity nearby but not utilized by any of the residents. Most land suitable for tilling, but 
small plots (around 1.5 khatta). Twenty minutes walking distance to the municipality center. 
 
Attariya camp (VDC ward Geta-3), Temporary, on occupied land owned by the government, 112 
households, of whom 9 were interviewed - chosen on a random basis. Bus service, electricity 
running through but not utilized by any residents, one water pump to share for the village as a 
whole. Most land not suitable for tilling, but small vegetable garden plots existed. 
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SUMMARY
The UN estimates that 20 million are held in bonded labor. Several economic 
analyses assert that bonded laborers accept these contracts voluntarily, which 
could imply that a ban would make such laborers worse off. We question the 
voluntary nature of bonded labor, discuss different theories and new evidence on 
the issue, and propose a new mechanism whereby landlords keep workers trapped. 
With different types of landlords not revealed to the laborer, we show how some 
landlords manipulate loan terms so that the laborer becomes bonded if future 
labor is rendered as collateral. Enforcement mechanisms and the monopolistic 
market for credit thus play a joint role. Providing alternative sources of credit, 
offering proper conflict resolution institutions for settling labor-contract 
disputes and banning the practice of bonded labor could emancipate bonded 
laborers, which would make them better off.  
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